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1 Evil, Theodicy, and Skeptical Theism 
In his influential essay “Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral 
Skepticism,” Daniel Howard-Snyder relates the story of Ashley Jones, a twelve-year-old 
girl “who, while babysitting her neighbor’s children, was raped and bludgeoned to death 
by an escapee from a local juvenile detention center” in the state of Washington.1  He 
uses the phrase “Ashley’s suffering” to denote “the evil done to...Ashley...and what she 
suffered and lost” as a result of that evil (18). 
 If God exists as portrayed by traditional monotheism—a being perfect in 
knowledge, power, and goodness—then why did God let Ashley’s suffering occur?  To 
answer that question on God’s behalf is to offer a theodicy.  A theodicy aims to justify 
God’s permission of Ashley’s suffering on the grounds that such permission (i) achieves 
some particular outweighing good that not even a perfect being could achieve at less cost, 
                                                 
1 Howard-Snyder 2009: 18.  To avoid needless clutter in what follows, further 
citations of this particular work will give page number only. 
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or (ii) prevents some even worse particular outcome that not even a perfect being could 
prevent at less cost, or else (iii) is an unfortunate side-effect of some good that’s too good 
to give up (such as unchecked libertarian free will on the part of human agents) and 
furthermore a side-effect that not even a perfect being could prevent. 
 In my experience, the most popular theodicies belong to type (iii).  By far the 
most popular token of that type, judging from my experience in front of university 
classrooms and in front of audiences at both public and academic forums, is one that 
invokes libertarian (i.e., contracausal) free will—hereafter, “LFW.”  This theodicy claims 
that the possession of LFW by human agents—crucially, LFW totally unconstrained by 
God—is a good that’s too good to give up, even if it has the unavoidable side-effect of 
Ashley’s suffering at the hands of someone exercising LFW.  I frankly don’t understand 
the popularity of this indefensible theodicy, especially among philosophers who ought to 
know better.2  Because of its relentless prevalence, I feel justified in singling it out for 
criticism.  It  fails on several grounds; space here allows me to mention just four of them. 
 First, the theodicy assumes that LFW is both a coherent notion and also the only 
kind of freedom that makes possible the moral agency we value as human beings; both 
assumptions are highly contentious, to put it mildly.  It’s far from clear that LFW can be 
explained coherently and, even if it can, it’s far from clear that any morally responsible 
agent must possess LFW that not even God may ever constrain.3 
                                                 
2 For example, when I presented Maitzen 2009 as a colloquium paper at the American 
Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting in 2006, my commentator, a noted 
philosopher of religion, relied almost entirely on the LFW theodicy in his public 
response. 
3 See, for example, Fischer et al. 2007, in which Robert Kane’s three co-contributors 
aim telling objections at his libertarian theory of free will.  In my judgment, Kane’s 
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 Second, it assumes that LFW has so much intrinsic positive value that God would 
rightly refrain from ever constraining it, an assumption that overstates the value we 
assign to freedom in general, including LFW if indeed we have it.  As Derk Pereboom 
notes, from the commonsense moral perspective “the evildoer’s freedom is a weightless 
consideration, not merely an outweighed consideration” (Pereboom 2005: 84, citing 
Lewis 1993: 155).4  In assessing the escapee’s rape and murder of Ashley, our 
commonsense moral attitude assigns no discernible positive value to the escapee’s having 
freely committed those crimes.  Indeed, nothing could be more obvious than the fact that 
we don’t regard a serious wrongdoer’s freedom as a value that stands in the way of our 
preventing his wrongdoing; on the contrary, we often regard ourselves as not just 
permitted but obligated to interfere with the wrongdoer’s freedom.  Hence the totally 
hands-off policy that the LFW theodicy attributes to God has no analogue at all in our 
moral practice. 
 Third, in claiming that God would never interfere with human LFW, the theodicy 
runs up against the scriptural portrayal of God as having manipulated human decisions 
such as Pharaoh’s: “The LORD hardened the heart of Pharaoh, the king of Egypt, so he 
chased after the people of Israel...” (Exodus 14:8a, NLT).  Indeed, according to scripture 
God may well have a regular practice of “hardening hearts” and thereby interfering with 
human free choice: “So you see, God chooses to show mercy to some, and he chooses to 
harden the hearts of others so they refuse to listen” (Romans 9:18, NLT).  In any case, if 
                                                                                                                                                 
replies to those objections only highlight the implausibility (arguably, the incoherence) of 
his theory. 
4 Howard-Snyder wisely doubts that “being free” has intrinsic positive value: “I doubt 
that my being free [to perform a particular good action] is a state of affairs that is good in 
itself” (23, emphasis in original). 
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God’s hardening of hearts is consistent with the inviolable nature of human LFW, then so 
too would be God’s softening the heart of the escapee so that he refrains from raping and 
killing Ashley.5 
 Fourth, there’s evidence that the theodicy errs in assuming that our everyday 
moral judgments care at all about the existence of LFW.  If we can regard Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence as accurately reflecting our commonsense moral 
practice—if, in other words, the criminal law doesn’t war with commonsense morality on 
this issue—then it’s clear that we routinely hold agents morally responsible without 
regard to whether they possess LFW.  Juries routinely convict defendants without even 
asking, let alone ascertaining, whether the defendants’ actions were causally determined 
by prior states of the universe.  Likewise judges never, as far as I know, instruct jurors to 
satisfy themselves of the defendant’s LFW before they issue a verdict.  One might 
explain this omission by insisting that the law simply presupposes the defendant’s LFW 
and regards the presupposition as too obvious to need saying.  But this explanation 
misunderstands the law’s attitude toward obvious presuppositions.  Judges’ instructions 
to juries routinely include platitudes so obvious that only lawyers would bother to make 
them explicit, such as the admonition that witnesses don’t always tell the truth.6  In such a 
                                                 
5 Christian philosopher Peter van Inwagen (1995: 54) declares it to be obvious that 
God’s hardening an agent’s heart deprives the agent of LFW on that occasion. 
6 Indeed, when the issue of LFW does come up in the criminal law, appellate courts 
tend to remind trial courts that the issue isn’t relevant to criminal responsibility.  See, for 
instance, the much-cited holding in State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965), 
202–203: “Criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the conscious.  If a 
person thinks, plans, and executes the plan at that level, the criminality of his act cannot 
be denied, wholly or partially, because, although he did not realize it, his conscious 
[mind] was influenced to think, to plan and to execute the plan by unconscious influences 
which were the product of his genes and his lifelong environment.  [C]riminal guilt 
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context, the persistent failure to mention LFW would be inexplicable if LFW were 
relevant, especially since the libertarian holds that defendants are blameless if they lack 
LFW when they commit the crimes of which they’re accused.  In short, to the extent to 
which the criminal law reflects them, our actual moral judgments pay no attention to 
LFW. 
 Given the abject failure of this most popular of theodicies, I can understand why 
skeptical theists don’t hold out much hope for the enterprise of theodicy.  I share their 
dim view of its prospects.  Skeptical theists don’t like our chances of explaining, in any 
way that would satisfy most reasonable people, why God allowed Ashley to be raped and 
killed.  They recognize that, even after thinking hard about it, we come up empty when 
we try to identify (i) a particular outweighing good that not even God could achieve 
without allowing Ashley’s suffering; or (ii) an even worse particular outcome that not 
even God could prevent without allowing Ashley’s suffering; or (iii) some good that’s 
too good to give up, of which Ashley’s suffering was a side-effect that not even God 
could prevent. 
 Skeptical theists, however, don’t find it the least bit surprising that we’re so bad at 
coming up with satisfying theodicies.  According to skeptical theism, we shouldn’t think 
that our grasp of possible goods and evils, or our grasp of what it takes to achieve those 
goods and avoid those evils, even remotely approaches God’s perfect grasp of these 
matters, particularly if we can’t rule out that people experience goods and evils not just in 
this life but also in an eternal afterlife.  As the skeptical theist Michael Bergmann says, 
“It just doesn’t seem unlikely that our understanding of the realm of value falls miserably 
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot be denied or confined...because [the defendant] was unaware that his decisions 
and conduct were mechanistically directed by unconscious influences.” 
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short of capturing all that is true about that realm” (Bergmann 2001: 279).  Because 
skeptical theists are theists, they believe that a perfect God exists, and so they believe that 
God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing whatever horrific evils occur.  But they 
say that we have no reason to think we could discover on our own what those morally 
sufficient reasons are. 
 Indeed, I think skeptical theism denies us any reason to think that we can discover 
God’s reasons even if God ostensibly tells us what they are.  For deception on God’s part 
isn’t automatically wrong, all things considered, and hence skeptical theism allows that 
God might deceive us for morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken, including when he 
apparently reveals to us his reasons for allowing some evil or other.7  In sum, skeptical 
theism denies us any confidence that we’ve ever managed to identify, by any means, the 
justification God actually relies on for any of his actions or omissions.  For all we know, 
any justification we entertain, however compelling it might seem to us, is shallower, or at 
least other, than the justification that actually motivates a perfectly wise God. 
 Skeptical theism has an obvious implication for well-known versions of the 
evidential argument from evil.  If we have no reason to think we would see God’s 
morally sufficient reasons for allowing some or all of the evil in our world, then our 
failure to see them—our failure to find a convincing theodicy—isn’t itself evidence that 
God has no such reasons (and hence doesn’t exist).  Now, one might accept that 
implication but argue that our failure to see God’s morally sufficient reasons is 
nevertheless best explained by the non-existence of those reasons even if it’s not evidence 
for their non-existence.  By the same token, my seeming to have hands might be best 
                                                 
7 See Wielenberg 2010 for much more on the relation between skeptical theism and 
our inability to rule out divine deception. 
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explained by my having hands, even if my seeming to have hands isn’t evidence that 
some undetectable skeptical scenario doesn’t obtain instead, such as one in which I’m a 
brain-in-a-vat being deceived into thinking I have hands.8 
 But I want to focus instead on a different reply to skeptical theism.  Many of its 
critics object that its skeptical attitude toward our grasp of the “realm of value” implies or 
reflects untenable moral skepticism, or induces appalling moral paralysis, or produces 
some equally dire result.  Howard-Snyder calls this popular objection to skeptical theism 
“the Moral Skepticism Objection” (18).  He aims to rebut the objection by rebutting it as 
an objection to the skeptical part of skeptical theism, which part he labels “Agnosticism,” 
a label he intentionally capitalizes, presumably in order to distinguish this position from 
others more commonly called “agnosticism.”  I’m unconvinced that he succeeds in 
defending Agnosticism against the Moral Skepticism Objection, for reasons that I’ll 
detail in Section 3.  I’m even less convinced that he succeeds in defending skeptical 
theism against the objection, for reasons that I’ll detail in Section 4.  Skeptical theism 
adds theism to Agnosticism, and the addition makes a difference.  If Howard-Snyder’s 
defense of Agnosticism has any use as a defense of skeptical theism against the Moral 
Skepticism Objection, then the objection shouldn’t become even stronger when you add 
theism to Agnosticism.  I’ll argue that it does become stronger. 
 
2 Howard-Snyder’s Defense of Agnosticism 
Howard-Snyder describes Agnosticism as holding that “we should be in doubt about” two 
issues: (a) “whether the goods we know of constitute a representative sample of all the 
                                                 
8 Russell 1996 defends both of these anti-skeptical claims on the basis of inferences to 
the best explanation. 
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goods there are” and (b) “whether each good we know of is such that the necessary 
conditions of its realization we know of are all [the necessary conditions of its realization 
that] there are” (18).  Thus Howard-Snyder’s Agnostic echoes the skeptical theist’s 
skepticism about our grasp of “the realm of value.”  Indeed, in all essential respects 
Agnosticism just is the skeptical part of skeptical theism. 
 Howard-Snyder then applies Agnosticism to the case of Ashley’s suffering.  
“Agnosticism,” he says, “tells us that since we should be in doubt about” (a) and (b), “we 
should be in doubt about whether there is a reason that would justify God’s non-
intervention” in Ashley’s case (19).  By our being “in doubt about” (a) or (b), Howard-
Snyder means our being “of two minds about it, ambivalent, undecided” (22).  The idea is 
that if we’re in doubt about whether there’s a reason that would justify God’s non-
intervention in the face of Ashley’s suffering, then we’re in doubt about whether God had 
a moral obligation to intervene that God failed to live up to. 
   Does Agnosticism imply that we should be in doubt about whether God did 
intervene to prevent Ashley’s suffering, despite our overwhelming impression that God 
didn’t?  Does Agnosticism imply that we may have missed God’s intervention?  Good 
question.  Because Howard-Snyder is concerned to defend Agnosticism against the 
charge that it implies an implausibly strong kind of skepticism, I presume he would reject 
such a radically skeptical reaction to the claim that God didn’t intervene.9  But back to 
the main issue.  If we should be in doubt about whether there’s a reason that would justify 
God’s non-intervention (assuming God didn’t intervene), then we shouldn’t accept the 
conclusions reached by standard versions of the evidential argument from evil: namely, 
                                                 
9 Although I won’t argue for the point here, it’s not clear to me that Agnosticism can 
avoid endorsing this radically skeptical reaction.  Bergmann 2012 argues that it can. 
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that there is no reason that would justify God’s non-intervention and therefore (given that 
God has such a reason if God exists) no God. 
 The Moral Skepticism Objection to Agnosticism that Howard-Snyder then 
considers is the following three-step argument (19, emphases added): 
 
(1) If Agnosticism is true, then we should be in doubt about whether we should 
have intervened to prevent Ashley’s suffering [even if we could have done so 
at no real risk to ourselves]. 
(2) We should not be in doubt about whether we should have intervened. 
(3) So, Agnosticism is false. 
 
According to the objection, Agnosticism implies that we should be undecided about 
whether we should have intervened to prevent Ashley’s suffering even if we could have 
done so at no cost to ourselves, a result that implies implausible moral skepticism on our 
part, or induces appalling moral paralysis in us, or both.  Howard-Snyder’s response is to 
argue that no type of “moral theory and principle” will make premises (1) and (2) of that 
three-step argument both come out true, and hence the Moral Skepticism Objection is 
unsound. 
 I want to clear out of the way a tempting rebuttal to the Moral Skepticism 
Objection that might occur to the reader.  It goes as follows.  Even if some reason 
justifies God in allowing Ashley’s suffering, that alone doesn’t make it likely that some 
reason justifies us in allowing Ashley’s suffering.  For an omniscient God can know, and 
thereby have, a reason to allow Ashley’s suffering even when we comparatively ignorant 
beings don’t know, and thereby don’t have, that reason.  Because God knows more than 
we do, the range of reasons that potentially justify God in allowing Ashley’s suffering is 
greater than the range of reasons that potentially justify us in allowing it. 
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 As obvious as this rebuttal may seem, it nevertheless fails.  Omniscience cuts both 
ways here.  Any reason to think that God’s omniscience reveals a greater range of reasons 
that justify allowing Ashley’s suffering is equally a reason to think that God’s 
omniscience reveals a greater range of reasons that prohibit allowing Ashley’s suffering.  
An omniscient God can know, and thereby have, reasons to prevent suffering that we 
comparatively ignorant beings don’t know and thereby don’t have.  Moreover, an all-
powerful God will have ways of preventing suffering that we comparatively powerless 
beings lack.  Given God’s knowledge and power, the legitimate reasons God has to allow 
suffering are just as likely to be fewer than the legitimate reasons we have.  It’s a 
commonplace of our moral practice that the less limited the agent, the fewer 
the justifications we’re willing to accept for the agent’s permission of suffering.  (As the 
Spider-Man Principle says, “With great power comes great responsibility.”)  So this 
tempting rebuttal to the Moral Skepticism Objection is, at best, a wash. 
 Before proceeding further, let me make a small but important point about the 
vagaries of English idiom.  The statement “We should have intervened” is 
straightforwardly interpreted as meaning “We were obligated to intervene: we were 
wrong not to intervene or would have been wrong had we not intervened.”  By contrast, 
the statement “We should be in doubt about whether we should have intervened” is less 
clear-cut.  It can plausibly be taken to mean (c) “We should be in doubt about whether we 
were obligated to intervene.”  But it can also plausibly be taken to mean (d) “We should 
be in doubt about whether we were permitted to intervene: we should be undecided about 
whether we did something wrong by intervening.”  The Moral Skepticism Objection, as I 
understand it, concerns only (c) and not (d): the objection alleges that Agnosticism 
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implies (c).  Therefore, a successful defense of Agnosticism against the objection must 
establish either that Agnosticism doesn’t imply (c) or that (c) isn’t false even if 
Agnosticism does imply (c). 
 Howard-Snyder aims to establish that disjunction.  He proceeds by dilemma,  
dividing theories of moral obligation into two exhaustive categories: roughly, those that 
say our obligation to intervene depends on the total consequences of our intervention, and 
those that say it doesn’t.  For convenience, let’s call those theories of moral obligation 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist, respectively.  He argues that consequentialist 
theories falsify premise (2) of the Moral Skepticism Objection, because they imply that 
we should be in doubt about our obligation to intervene in Ashley’s case.  After all, how 
can we know what the total consequences of our intervention will be?  Presumably, the 
total consequences of any action ramify indefinitely in space and time, far beyond what 
any of us can foresee.  So if our obligation to intervene depends on how the total 
consequences of our intervention happen to shake out, then—contrary to premise (2)—
we ought to admit that we’re clueless about whether we’re obligated to intervene.10 
 Howard-Snyder then argues that non-consequentialist theories, on the other hand, 
falsify premise (1) of the objection, because they imply that we shouldn’t be in doubt 
about our obligation to intervene in Ashley’s case, even if we acknowledge that we’re 
clueless about the total consequences of our intervention.11  Either way, then, the Moral 
Skepticism Objection contains a false premise.  As Howard-Snyder readily concedes, his 
discussion doesn’t address every possible consequentialist or non-consequentialist theory 
                                                 
10 I borrow the term “clueless” from Lenman 2000, an article cited favorably by 
Howard-Snyder (29 n. 20). 
11 Howard-Snyder’s argument contains details and nuances that my brief summary of 
it ignores, but not, I think, any details or nuances that block my criticism of it.  
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of moral obligation.  Still, he discusses a wide range of them, and he challenges his 
opponents to specify a moral “theory or principle” on which premises (1) and (2) of the 
Moral Skepticism Objection both come out true. 
 
3 Agnosticism and Commonsense Moral Obligation 
While Howard-Snyder’s point is worth making in the debate over skeptical theism, in a 
way his point isn’t really news.  As I see it, the Moral Skepticism Objection to 
Agnosticism reflects a worry arising from commonsense morality, and therefore the 
objection reflects the mixture of consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements that 
commonsense morality notoriously contains.  Commonsense morality apparently holds 
that, in general, the consequences of our intervention do and yet don’t matter to our 
obligation to intervene: commonsense morality is both consequentialist and non-
consequentialist, or neither purely one nor purely the other. 
 Witness, for example, the judgments elicited from those who ponder the infamous 
“trolley problem,” in which an agent must bring about the death of one innocent person 
or else allow five innocent people to be killed.12  The problem has become infamous 
because the judgments we tend to make reflect the aforementioned mixture of 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements: the consequentialist’s solution—
sacrificing one to save five—is, we say, sometimes morally permissible, perhaps even 
required, and sometimes morally wrong.  Nor can the philosophers who study the 
problem agree on a principled rationale for our diverse judgments.  Indeed, it’s a well-
known source of embarrassment in ethics that commonsense morality, being the 
                                                 
12 The locus classicus of the problem is Foot 1967, which stands at the head of a large 
scholarly and popular literature on it. 
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hodgepodge that it is, supplies counterexamples to every consequentialist or non-
consequentialist theory of moral obligation on offer.  That’s why neither 
consequentialists nor their opponents can legitimately claim victory in the age-old debate 
between them.13 
 So it shouldn’t surprise us if commonsense morality seems to make our obligation 
to intervene in Ashley’s case hinge on the total consequences of our intervention, just as 
premise (1) of the Moral Skepticism Objection implies, and yet seems not to make our 
obligation hinge on those consequences, just as premise (2) implies.  How should we 
handle this apparent inconsistency?  If commonsense morality is in fact self-inconsistent, 
then any theory at all conflicts with it, in which case it’s no knock against Agnosticism in 
particular that it conflicts with commonsense morality.  But I think we needn’t conclude 
that commonsense morality is self-inconsistent, and I’ll propose a way of resolving the 
apparent inconsistency, a way that casts doubt on Agnosticism. 
 I take it as obvious that commonsense morality does obligate us to intervene in 
Ashley’s case, particularly if we can intervene at no risk to ourselves.  I’ll offer a rational 
reconstruction of this obligation, an explanation of it that gives it a logically consistent 
basis, but a basis that’s incompatible with Agnosticism.  I don’t make the psychological 
claim that we actually entertain this rationale when we deliberate about intervening in 
cases such as Ashley’s.  On the contrary, in such cases we tend, I think, to act 
instinctively rather than deliberately and reflectively.  Nor need I claim that we explicitly 
                                                 
13 Consider this analogy: Arguably, no economic theory properly so-called (Marxism, 
free-market capitalism, you name it) captures the attitudes held by the average adult in 
the developed world about how to run an economy.  No economic theory accommodates 
the hodgepodge of views we might call “commonsense economics”: every theory says 
something that common sense rejects. 
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invoke the rationale retrospectively when we reflect on our intervention or non-
intervention.  I offer it as a rationale that makes the best sense possible of what 
commonsense morality says is our clear obligation to intervene.  If we were to go through 
this reasoning, our thinking would at least make sense. 
 Our obligation to intervene to prevent14 the suffering of an individual such as 
Ashley depends on what we predict will be the total consequences to that individual if we 
intervene or don’t intervene.  Ordinary language provides evidence that we restrict our 
focus in this way.  For it would be at least odd for us to say that we owed it to Ashley’s 
family or friends to protect her, and still more odd for us to say that we owed it to the 
universe or to future generations to do so.  On the contrary, in circumstances of the kind 
that Howard-Snyder relates, we say that we owed it to Ashley herself to intervene, or at 
least that we owed it to her above anyone else. 
 But at the same time we regard ourselves as obligated to intervene on Ashley’s 
behalf only if we at least implicitly assume that the total consequences for her will be 
better if we intervene than if we don’t.  Why do I claim that our obligation depends on 
this (at least implicit) assumption?  Because if we thought that our intervention made, for 
all we could tell, no positive difference to her overall welfare, we could make no sense of 
our being morally obligated to intervene.  We might be able to make sense of our being 
morally permitted to intervene, but permission is of course weaker than obligation. 
 Ordinary language provides evidence for my claim here as well.  Imagine 
someone who intervenes in Ashley’s case and thereby manages to stop what surely seems 
                                                 
14 Of course, we also think we’re obligated to relieve suffering in many cases, but that 
obligation falls under the heading of prevention for the simple reason that to relieve 
suffering is just to prevent further (or worse) suffering. 
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to be the immediate harm that she would otherwise have suffered.  Now imagine that 
Howard-Snyder’s Agnostic tells the intervener that his having acted to protect Ashley 
produced foreseeable consequences for her that bear no known relation to the total 
consequences for her: for all any of us can tell, Ashley is worse-off overall for his having 
intervened.  How might the intervener reply to the Agnostic?  He might well say, to begin 
with, “I did what any reasonable person would have thought was best for Ashley.”  But 
this language—in particular, the term “reasonable”—is the language of someone seeking 
exoneration for what he did, not the language of someone telling us he did his duty.15  
We’re inclined to say that no one can be faulted or blamed for intervening if he 
reasonably thought it would benefit an innocent person; this commonplace attitude 
underwrites Good Samaritan laws that protect interveners from liability if their 
intervention ends up causing harm.  But one’s being blameless for intervening doesn’t at 
all imply that one was obligated to intervene. 
 Indeed, if we think the intervener ought to have seen beforehand what the 
Agnostic now tells him—namely, that his intervention produced foreseeable 
consequences for Ashley that bear no known relation to the total consequences for her—
then we may not even excuse his conduct on the grounds that he reasonably believed it to 
be beneficial.  For if you accept what Agnosticism says about the haphazard relationship 
                                                 
15 Compare Eleonore Stump’s use of “reasonable” here: “God can see into the minds 
and hearts of human beings and determine what sort and amount of suffering is likely to 
produce the best results; we cannot.... Therefore, since all human suffering is prima facie 
evil, and since we do not know with any high degree of probability how much (if any) of 
it is likely to result in good for any particular sufferer on any particular occasion, it is 
reasonable for us to eliminate the suffering as much as we can” (Stump 1985: 412–413).  
This passage fails to explain why we’re obligated to eliminate suffering; at most it 
explains why we’re morally permitted to (try to) eliminate suffering even if we think that 
God might be allowing that very suffering in order to benefit the sufferer. 
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between the consequences for Ashley that you can foresee and the consequences for her 
that actually obtain, why should you assign any weight at all to the consequences you can 
foresee?  According to Agnosticism, you should regard the foreseeable consequences as 
no better than a coin-toss in predicting the total consequences of your intervention.  Why 
intervene on the basis of what you can reasonably discern if you think that what you can 
reasonably discern bears no reliable connection to what’s really the case?  Indeed, I can 
imagine an Agnostic being motivated to criticize the intervener along these lines: “You 
say that you saw some reason to intervene and saw no reason not to.  But you should 
have recognized that your failure to see a reason against intervening has no probative 
value: for all you could tell, your intervention did Ashley much more harm than good.” 
 Alternatively, the intervener might reply to the Agnostic this way: “From what 
you’ve told me, I now see that by intervening I took a shot in the dark, since the 
consequences for Ashley that I could foresee don’t at all predict the overall consequences 
for her.  But it was a shot I had to take.”  Unlike “reasonable,” the language “had to take” 
does suggest obligation, but it’s odd language for the intervener to use here: why “had”?  
Normally, when we think we had to take a shot in the dark it’s because we think that 
taking a shot, while perhaps unlikely to succeed, offered us our best chance at success.  
But the Agnostic objects to thinking this way in Ashley’s case.  According to 
Agnosticism, we have no reason to think that our intervention, our taking a shot in the 
dark because it seems to offer us our best chance to benefit Ashley overall, is in fact how 
it seems to us.  For it’s no less probable, given what we know, that our not intervening 
offers us our best chance to benefit her overall. 
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 Most likely of all, however, the intervener will reply to the Agnostic in something 
like this way: “It’s absurd to say that I only guessed that I’d help Ashley overall if I 
prevented what looked to be an imminent assault on her.  You say that the consequences 
for Ashley of my intervention that I could foresee don’t reliably indicate the overall 
consequences for her.  You say that, for all I can tell, I made her worse-off overall by 
intervening.  But that’s crazy.  Of course she’s better-off overall because I intervened.  Or 
at the very least she’s probably better-off overall.”  I think a response along those lines 
makes the best sense of his—and our—belief that he was obligated to intervene.  But it’s 
a response that Agnosticism must reject. 
 On my reconstruction of it, then, commonsense morality accepts premise (2) of 
the Moral Skepticism Objection, because we know we ought to intervene.  But it also 
accepts premise (1).  For Agnosticism tells us we had better not rest our obligation to 
intervene on the assumption that our intervention will help Ashley overall: we should 
admit that we have no idea whether it will.  Instead, according to Agnosticism, if our 
obligation to intervene stems at all from the consequences the intervention produces for 
Ashley, then the only consequences that it makes sense for us to regard as relevant are 
those that we can foresee. 
 Surely the consequences for Ashley do matter in some way to our obligation to 
intervene; any plausible position accepts that point, and commonsense morality certainly 
accepts it.  Yet Agnosticism says that the consequences we can foresee are “but a drop in 
the ocean,” as Howard-Snyder puts it (30), a negligible contribution to the total 
consequences for Ashley.  Moreover, all we know about is the drop, and we have no 
reason to think that the nature of the drop represents the nature of the ocean.  If we 
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operated with that Agnostic outlook, I can’t see how we would regard ourselves as 
obligated to add our drop to the ocean—obligated to make that negligible contribution—
rather than merely allowed to add it.16  Given what Agnosticism sees as the haphazard 
relation between the overall consequences and the vanishingly small fraction that we can 
foresee, it makes no sense to take those we can foresee seriously enough to ground our 
obligation on them.  Agnostics might reply that “we have some evidence that Ashley will 
benefit if we intervene and none that she’ll benefit if we don’t intervene.  So, given that 
we ought to follow our evidence, we ought to intervene.”17  But, again, why are we 
obligated to follow our evidence if we accept the Agnostic claim that our evidence is no 
better than a coin-toss in predicting whether our intervention will benefit Ashley in the 
way that really matters, i.e., overall?  That’s why I’ve portrayed commonsense morality 
as confidently assuming that our intervention will benefit her overall. 
 Agnostics may dismiss commonsense morality’s confident assumption as 
epistemically unwarranted, but they face the challenge of explaining our obligation to 
intervene in way that doesn’t have us making the assumption.  Bear in mind, too, that the 
scope of the assumption is restricted to the overall consequences of our intervention for 
Ashley in particular.  Because we restrict our focus to the overall consequences for her, 
we presumably deserve to be more confident than we would had our focus included not 
just Ashley but all the morally significant beings ever affected by our intervention.  
Nevertheless, I can’t see that greater degree of confidence making any difference from 
                                                 
16 As David Anderson remarked in conversation, when Agnosticism tells us to 
intervene (or not) on the basis of foreseeable consequences despite their bearing no 
known relation to total consequences, it seems to be telling us “how to keep our noses 
clean,” how to avoid being blameworthy for intervening.  Again, however, we can 
intervene blamelessly without being obligated to intervene. 
17 An anonymous reviewer offered this reply. 
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the Agnostic’s perspective: Agnosticism still says that we can do no better than guess that 
our intervention will benefit Ashley herself overall.  For that reason, I’ve argued, 
Agnostics don’t leave commonsense morality just as they found it. 
 In sum, I’ve responded to Agnosticism on behalf of commonsense morality in 
roughly the way G. E. Moore responds to external-world skepticism on behalf of 
commonsense knowledge.  Commonsense morality tells us we should be confident that 
we’re obligated to intervene in Ashley’s case.  But commonsense morality also 
recognizes that we shouldn’t be confident of that obligation if we think that Agnosticism 
is true—if we think that, for all we know, we’ll do Ashley much more harm than good by 
intervening.  So we shouldn’t think that Agnosticism is true.  Moore notoriously 
dismisses the external-world skeptic’s conclusion: “You might as well suggest that I do 
not know that I am now standing up and talking—that perhaps after all I’m not, and that 
it’s not quite certain that I am!” (Moore 1959: 146).  I’m suggesting that commonsense 
morality likewise dismisses the Agnostic’s claim that, for all we know, we’ll do Ashley 
much more harm than good if we intervene on her behalf. 
 
4 Adding Theism to Agnosticism 
Howard-Snyder argues (42–45) that the Moral Skepticism Objection proves no more 
effective against skeptical theism—i.e., no more effective against the conjunction of 
Agnosticism and theism—than against Agnosticism alone.  He recognizes that skeptical 
theism may at least appear more vulnerable to the Moral Skepticism Objection, for 
skeptical theists, unlike non-theistic Agnostics, believe that 
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there really is some reason that justifies God’s non-intervention in Ashley’s case, 
...a reason that God actively used to permit Ashley’s suffering, so to speak, and if 
we have no idea at all what it is, then, for all we can tell, there is a reason for us 
not to intervene.... [43] 
 
But Howard-Snyder replies that here, as elsewhere, we shouldn’t trust the appearances.  
For two reasons, he says, skeptical theism is in fact no more vulnerable to the objection 
than Agnosticism is. 
 One of those reasons is his earlier claim that neither consequentialist nor non-
consequentialist theories of moral obligation make both premises of the Moral 
Skepticism Objection come out true, whether or not we include theism in the mix.  I 
conceded that claim and offered in reply a reconstruction of our commonsense moral 
obligation to intervene in Ashley’s case on which we take for granted that our 
intervention will do her more overall good than harm.  I don’t claim to have provided 
anything that deserves to be called “a theory of moral obligation,” only a reconstruction 
of our ordinary moral attitude.  I have nothing to add here to that earlier discussion. 
 Howard-Snyder’s other reason is that skeptical theists—theists who accept 
Agnosticism—can “reasonably think God has instructed humankind to prevent suffering 
in general and that God permits a lot of it precisely because he intends for us to try to 
prevent it” (43–44).  This divine instruction allegedly overcomes any ambivalence about 
intervening that skeptical theists might otherwise feel.  Elsewhere I’ve criticized at length 
the notion that skeptical theists can rely on God’s commands for moral guidance, and I 
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won’t repeat all of those criticisms here.18  But I do want to raise three objections to 
Howard-Snyder’s claim that skeptical theists can “reasonably think God has instructed 
humankind to prevent suffering in general and that God permits a lot of it precisely 
because he intends for us to try to prevent it.” 
 First, even if skeptical theists can reasonably conclude that God has commanded 
us to prevent suffering in general (a command, by the way, that’s hard to find in the 
monotheistic scriptures), what does such a command mean?  Presumably it doesn’t mean, 
for instance, that we should prevent all painful childhood vaccinations, for we justifiedly 
believe that vaccinations benefit children overall despite the fact that needles can really 
hurt when you’re a kid.  It must mean, instead, that we should prevent a child’s suffering 
unless we justifiedly believe that permitting the suffering will benefit the child overall.  
But skeptical theists say that we should never regard ourselves as justified in the belief 
that what we do will benefit the child overall: to regard ourselves as justified in that 
belief is to presume insight into the total consequences of our action—insight that 
Agnostics, including skeptical theists, say we have no right to presume.  Skeptical theism, 
therefore, denies us the epistemic self-regard we need to apply the command to prevent 
suffering in general. 
 My two remaining objections concern the familiar enough suggestion “that God 
permits a lot of [suffering] precisely because he intends for us to try to prevent it.”  First, 
and in the present context ironically, it doesn’t apply to Ashley’s suffering.  According to 
newspaper accounts, no human agent was realistically in a position to prevent the 
                                                 
18 See Maitzen 2007, which Howard-Snyder cites in a footnote to his claim about 
God’s instructions to humankind (44 n. 47) without indicating that I dispute his claim.  In 
fact, because the footnote simply reads “Cp. Maitzen 2007,” it may give readers the 
misimpression that I concur with his claim. 
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escapee’s rape and murder of Ashley.  The escapee simply failed to return to his halfway 
house after being allowed out earlier in the day for a routine shift at his job; the five 
young children Ashley was babysitting were all asleep when the crime occurred.  Her 
case is of course not unusual in this regard.  Much suffering occurs in the presence of 
only a perpetrator and a victim, with no third human agent in a position to prevent 
anything. 
 Second, I find it incredible that a being who merits the label “perfect” could 
permit, or even risk, a child’s horrible suffering precisely so that we can try to prevent it 
from occurring or from continuing.  Indeed, no being who deserves to be called even 
“decent” could do that.  Any human agent who acted that way would have to be depraved 
or deranged.  Such treatment of a child can only be regarded as morally intolerable 
exploitation, even if it’s exploitation on the part of the child’s creator.19  Any being that 
exploits innocent children thereby fails to merit the description “perfect” or the title of 
God.  It follows, then, that God never risks, let alone permits, a child’s horrible suffering 
in order to give us a chance to intervene.20   
 More generally, because exploiting children by its very nature implies a defect in 
the power, knowledge, or goodness of the exploiter, no perfect being can possibly exploit 
children for any reason.  Therefore, no perfect God can possibly permit a child to endure 
suffering  (presumably undeserved and unwanted) except as a consequence of something 
                                                 
19 For defense of this claim, see Maitzen 2009 and 2010b. 
20 In correspondence, David Anderson described an “Open Notion of Providence” on 
which “God freely abdicates control over...rational human agents” such as the escapee, 
thereby permitting the escapee to rape and kill Ashley.  It’s a commonplace that some 
abdications of control are immoral abdications of responsibility.  God acts immorally if 
he abdicates responsibility for preventing Ashley’s suffering so that (somehow) we 
become responsible for trying to prevent it. 
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that’s necessary for, or optimal for securing, the child’s own greater good.21  To apply the 
point to Ashley’s suffering in particular, no perfect God can possibly permit Ashley’s 
suffering unless as a consequence of something necessary for, or optimal for securing, 
Ashley’s greater good.  Otherwise, God would be exploiting Ashley for some ulterior 
purpose.  But if God exists then God did permit it, or at any rate Agnosticism can’t tell us 
to be in doubt about whether God did, for that would commit Agnostics to a degree of 
skepticism Howard-Snyder seems concerned to avoid.  So it must have been for her own 
good, all things considered. 
 In that case, contrary to Howard-Snyder, Agnosticism isn’t “at home” (42) with 
theism.  If we believe theism, we should believe that Ashley’s suffering was a 
consequence of something necessary or optimal for her own net benefit, whereas if we’re 
Agnostics we should be in doubt about whether it was.  Furthermore, if we believe that 
Ashley’s suffering was a consequence of something necessary or optimal for her own net 
benefit, then we should be (at least) in doubt about whether we would have been 
obligated to prevent her suffering had we been able to.  For if we believe that a 
vaccination is necessary or optimal for a child’s benefit, all things considered (the pain 
and risks of the vaccination included), then we should be (at least) in doubt about whether 
we ought to prevent it even though it hurts.  That’s an understatement, of course: in such 
circumstances we believe we have no obligation to prevent the vaccination and, if 
                                                 
21 To be clear, I intend this principle as a constraint on God’s permission of such 
suffering in any possible world, regardless of our actions in that world.  In Maitzen 2009, 
2010a, and 2010b, I defend the principle against objections that it may now occur to the 
reader to raise.  I think the principle extends to any case in which God permits 
undeserved, involuntary human suffering, but it’s clearest in the case of children because 
of their (absolute or comparative) lack of autonomy.  Christian philosopher Eleonore 
Stump has long endorsed a principle of this sort; see, e.g., Stump 1985, 1990, 2012. 
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anything, some obligation to bring it about.  Recall that Howard-Snyder aims to show 
that skeptical theism—the conjunction of theism and Agnosticism—should make us no 
more doubtful about our obligation to intervene in Ashley’s case than we are 
independently of it.  Commonsense morality, I argued earlier, leaves us in no doubt about 
that obligation.  Skeptical theism leaves us in serious doubt about it, or worse. 
 As the vaccination analogy shows, we regard ourselves as obligated to prevent 
suffering by a child only if we discount (or dismiss altogether, or confidently regard as 
unlikely) the possibility that the child will be better-off if we don’t prevent it.  Nothing in 
our experience suggests that children benefit in general if allowed to suffer, or at least 
nothing in our experience suggests that in general we can’t tell when they benefit if 
allowed to suffer.  I’ve argued that Agnosticism and skeptical theism turn all of that on its 
head.  Agnosticism tells us we shouldn’t think we can tell when a child will benefit 
overall if allowed to suffer.  Skeptical theism, because it adds theism to Agnosticism, 
goes further: it gives us reason to think that a child must be better-off, or at least no 
worse-off, if allowed to suffer.  If, despite my argument, that last claim strikes you as too 
strong to be plausible, the following comparative claim is weaker and hence more 
plausible: the worse a child’s suffering, the more reason theism gives us for thinking that 
the suffering must be a consequence of something necessary or optimal for the child’s 
own good, and hence the less reason theism gives us to prevent the suffering.  We ought 
to prevent mild suffering first, extreme suffering later.  From the perspective of 
commonsense morality, that weaker claim is trouble enough. 
 One last point in closing.  Howard-Snyder argues that his rebuttal of the Moral 
Skepticism Objection shows that Agnosticism comports just as well with naturalism as it 
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does with theism (43).  But one reason to think it doesn’t is this: theism asserts, while 
naturalism denies, the possibility that we’ll experience goods or evils in an afterlife that 
lasts forever.  According to naturalism, all the goods and evils Ashley will ever 
experience came to an end with her natural death.  Clearly, then, if naturalism is true we 
have a more reliable grasp of those goods and evils, and of what it takes to achieve the 
former and avoid the latter, than we do if Ashley’s experience of goods and evils 
continues post mortem.  Our judgment that intervening to prevent Ashley’s rape and 
murder is good for her overall is therefore also more reliable if naturalism is true than if 
theism is true.  I’ve argued that our commonsense moral obligation to intervene hinges on 
that judgment, and so I count this as another reason to regard commonsense morality as 
more at home with naturalism than with Agnosticism, theism, or their combination. 
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